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Transcribed by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen1
Abstract. Hereby we publish fi ve (previously unpublished) excerpts from Charles S. 
Peirce’s manuscripts – one from the Prescott Book (MS 277, 1909) and four from the 
Logic Notebook (MS 339, October 1905–March 1906, 1909). Th ese concern the problems 
of classifi cation of signs.
Keywords: classifi cation of signs, tuone, token, type, potentive, interrogative, 
ejaculative, desiderative, imperative, signifi cative, eidoseme, ergoseme, logoseme, 
interpretant
Headnote. Peirce’s lifelong project to defi ne, classify and analyse signs has bred a century of 
interpretations. Th ose interpretations have been rife with truths, half-truths, one-and-the-
half-truths and outright misdemeanours. Much of the trouble, imprecision and confusion, it 
is fair to say, has been caused by the unavailability of those key writings that concern divisions 
that have the most value. At the same time, there has been disproportionate emphasis on 
outcroppings that have been available for long time but which, even on Peirce’s own account, 
were superseded by increasingly better expositions.
As far as his late analyses of signs are concerned, Peirce took his most valuable classifi catory 
attempts to be those that he draft ed only over a couple of months in late 1905 and early 1906. 
Most of them are found in the Logic Notebook in a dreadfully untidy condition. Th ese attempts 
have never been published before and are hardly ever referred to in the secondary literature. 
Yet they sparked off  perhaps the most productive phase of his thought. His remarks from 
those months suggest quite novel and surprising perspectives that were to benefi t his later 
work in semeiotic.
What the reader will fi nd below is only a teaser to illustrate the magnitude of those 
perspectives. Despite appearances, we do not have merely someone obsessed with inventing 
increasingly unintelligible euphemisms to denote various signs. Th ere is an orderly scientifi c 
mind that struggles to picture and communicate that rich and diverse landscape of signs – not 
unlike what one might envision on a new exoplanet – on which semeiotic analyses could then 
fearlessly proceed on their course.
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Our selection is based on Peirce’s own designations that come from the likewise unpublished 
Prescott Book (MS 277) of late 1909. Th e value of Peirce’s remarks in this opening selection is 
that they point out which among dozens of other similar draft s and frustrated attempts could 
redeem the still-to-date largely unfulfi lled promise to bring together the logical, conceptual, 
cognitive and epistemological workings of signs. Th is “pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman”, 
who half a century earlier had embarked on doing precisely that in his early papers,  is drawn 
to conclude the notebook with the sentence: “Let it be admitted then that no act of thinking 
can involve thinking about that very act of thinking.”
Are there signs that can represent themselves? And if there are, can they do that in a 
complete manner or do the paradoxes or self-reference and knowledge, failure of the KK-thesis, 
logical omniscience, implicit knowledge (unawareness), temporality of events, incompleteness, 
or meta-semeiotic or meta-linguistic facts of the matter thwart the enterprise? Do we for 
these reasons need a classifi cation that organizes signs in ranks and structures with neat 
subordination and elaborate inferential relations? Let the knowledgeable decide, but one thing 
is certain: Peirce’s division of signs is full of surprises that we are only beginning to unravel.
Logic Notebook (MS 339), November 1, 1909 [360r].2 During the last three years I 
have been resting from my work on the Division of Signs and have only lately – in 
the last week or two been turning back to it; and I fi nd my work of 1905 better than 
any since that time, though the latter doubtless has value and must not be passed by 
without consideration.
Looking over the book labelled in red “Th e Prescott Book”, and also this one, I 
fi nd the entries in this book of “Provisional Classifi cation of 1906 March 31” [275r, 
Appendix A] and of 1905 Oct 13 [262r, Appendix B] particularly important from my 
present (accidentally limited, no doubt) point of view; particularly in regard to the 
point made in the Prescott Book 1909 Oct 28 and what immediately preceded that in 
that book but is not dated [Appendix C].
Namely, a good deal of my early attempts to defi ne the diff erence between Icon, 
Index, and Symbol, were adulterated with confusion with the distinction as to the 
Reference of the Dynamic Interpretant to the Sign.
Th e amount of labour still required upon the ten trichotomies of signs (and more 
than these ten I don’t inquire into, not because I don’t think they are in truth there, 
but simply because it will be all I possibly can do to defi ne and to prove these ten) is 
enough of itself to occupy the 10± years of effi  cient thinking that may remain to me 
if no accident cuts them short.
Th e light which the two trichotomies referred to in the last paragraph but one 
above throws upon each other suggests a mode method of study that I have hitherto 
2 Th e numbers in the square brackets refer to the Logic Notebook pagination later added 
to it. Editorial interventions in this diplomatic transcription are denoted by italized square 
brackets []. Th e title of the selection has been provided by the transcriber. 
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employed only in getting as clear ideas as I have (and they ought to be more defi nite) 
of the fi rst and second trichotomies or [using the excellent notation of 1905 Oct 12 
[Appendix D]] A and Ba. I am now employing applying the same method to Bbβ and 
Cbβ. It ought to be applied not merely to A and Ba but further to A, Ba, and Ca taken 
together. Also to A Ba Bbα to A Ba Cbα to Bbα Cbα. Th en to A Bβ Ccγ etc. to Ba Bbα 
Ccα to A Bbα Ccα etc.
[361r] A “Sign” is an Ens (i.e. something, and it may be of any category of being) 
which, in addition to not only has a capacity of being either imagined, perceived, 
or conceived, as anything of the same category of Being of which one has suffi  cient 
happens to have enough of the right kind of dealings may be but also has the property 
of producing in a mind which perceives it and which has skill, or practical un through 
upon a person who fulfi lls in whom certain conditions are fulfi lled eff ects that another 
thing or a collection of other things would fulfi ll produce, those conditions being the 
possession by that person of a practical understanding of the system of correspondence.
But this defi nition ought to be prefaced with the remark that no know event of 
cognition event of learning anything brings per se any other knowledge than its content 
that which it has in learning; and in particular does not include any knowledge about 
that event of learning itself. Th us seeing does [not] include a sight of the eye or any 
knowledge about the learning itself. True, Hamilton and others insist that to know 
includes the knower’s knowing that he knows; and in the limited sense in which he 
here used the word know, one must admit that something is true which those words 
seem to express. Nevertheless, merely knowing a fact does not include the knowledge 
that that very act per se includes any knowledge about itself, any more than seeing 
includes any vision of the event of sight itself. When one fi rst comes to assent to this 
truth that in any solid that has no hole through it nor any hole enclosed in it, the 
number of edges is less by two than the sum of the numbers of its distinct surfaces and 
of summits (supposing everyone of the former is bounded has an edge all round it by 
three or more edges and that every one of the latter simply extends from one summit 
to another), he is thinking his thought is exclusively occupied with the solid and its 
parts, and he is not thinking at all of himself or his knowledge. And if Hamilton does 
not call an assent, however unqualifi ed and confi dent, by the name of “knowledge” 
unless it be accompanied by a recognition of its acceptance by the knower, then it 
is undoubtedly true that to know is to know that one knows that which one knows, 
but it still remains false that to know is to know that one knows that one knows one’s 
knowledge of the former knowing that one knows it, in the sense of actively thinking 
it, though one undoubtedly has what the scholastics call an habitual knowledge of it, 
that is to say a disposition to accept it as soon as the question occurs to the person 
supposed.
Let it be admitted then that no act of thinking can involve thinking about that 
very act of thinking. [End of the Logic Notebook]
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APPENDIX A. Excerpts from the Logic Notebook (MS 339)
1906 March 31 [275r]. Provisional Classifi cation of Signs.
                      A Sign is
                                                      in its own nature
is either A Tone
which has all its beings 
whether it exists or not
A Token
whose being consists in 
dyadic relations
or A Type
where being consists of 
the order of whatever may 
come hereaft er to be or in 
the order that will be shown 
whenever certain kinds of 
action shall take place
in reference to its Immediate Object
is either Indefi nite Singular or General Sign    *
in reference to the nature of its Real Object
is either Abstract Concrete or Collective      *
in reference to its relation to its Real Object
is either Icon Index or Symbol        *
in reference to its Intended Interpretant      (1906 Aug 30 Transpose fi rst and third)
is either Ponitive Imperative or Interrogatory
in reference to the nature of its Dynamic Interpretant
is either Poetic
or excitant of feeling
Eidoseme
Stimulant
or excitant of Action
Ergoseme
or Impressive
or determinant of a Habit
Logoseme
in reference to its relation to its Dynamic Interpretant
is either Sympathetic Compulsive or Rational
in reference to the Nature of its Normal Interpretant
is either Strange Common or Novel
in reference to the Passion of its Normal Interpretant
is either Substitute Suggestive Suggestive Assertive or Argument
in reference to the Signifi cance of its Normal Interpretant
is either Monadic Dyadic or Triadic    ? ?
1906 April 2. Notes on my Provisional Classifi cation of Signs. I have thought of the 
Object of a Sign as that which determines the sign; and this is well thought. I have 
thought of the Interpretant as that which the Sign determines or might determine or 
should determine, but this is not so well. For my idea of determination is dyadic while 
the idea of the relation of the interpretant to the sign is triadic.
Say the Interpretant is that which the Sign brings into the correspondence with 
the Object.
Th e Object is plainly Twofold. Th e Dynamic Object is the Real Object according 
to the above defi nition. Th e Immediate Object is the Object as presented in the Sign.
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Th e Interpretant is Th reefold. Th e Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant, 
embracing all that the Sign could reveal concerning the Object to a suffi  ciently 
penetrating mind, being more than any possible mind, however penetrable, could 
conclude from it, since there is no end to the distinct conclusions that could be drawn 
concerning the Object from any Sign. Th e Dynamic Interpretant is just what is drawn 
from the Sign by a given Individual Interpreter. Th e Immediate Interpretant is the 
interpretant represented, explicitly or implicitly, in the sign itself. I have thus omitted 
the intended interpretant. So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to 
the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant 
of another sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of that sign.
As to the Matter of the Sign itself, it is either a Tuone or a Token or a Type. Th e 
word [‘Tuone’] is a blend of Tone and Tune. It means a quality of feeling which is 
signifi cant, whether it be simple, like a Tone or a complex, like a Tune. But the latter 
is not pure feeling. By a Token, I mean an existing thing or an actual historical event 
which serves as a Sign.
By a Type, I mean a general form which can be repeated indefi nitely and is in all 
its repetitions one and the same sign. Th us the word the is a Type. It is likely to occur 
over a score of times on a page of an English book; but it is only one word twenty times 
repeated. Th e distinction between a Type and a Token is obvious. Th ere may be some 
confusion between the Tuone and the Type. Th ey may, however, be distinguished 
in various ways. In the fi rst place, [Type] is absolutely identical in all its instances 
or embodiments, while a Tone cannot have any identity, it has only similarity. Th us 
the sound of any vowel will be slightly diff erent every two times it is pronounced 
and then so far as it is so, it is two Tuones. But any two vowels in so far as they are 
alike are the same Tuone, in the only case in which there can be any sameness to a 
tuone. Anything then that could conceivably be made absolutely defi nite, bearing in 
mind that no two things can be exactly alike in any quality whatever, cannot be a 
Tuone. Another test is that a Tuome [Peirce occasionally misspells Tuone as Tuome] 
though it may be composed of many ingredients is, like a chemical compound of many 
elements, perfectly homogenous and structureless in eff ect, while a Type, though it 
may be indecomposable, must be more or less complex in its relations. Tests might be 
multiplied; yet aft er all, it will oft en require subtlety to decide whether a given sign 
is a Tuone or a Type. Take for example a given melody, say the Last Rose of Summer. 
Considered as to its structure it is a Type; but considered as a whole in its esthetic 
eff ect which is not composed of one part due to one note and another to another, it is 
a Tuome. As ordinarily conceived it is a Tuone, slightly diff erent however every time, 
it is sure, but from the point of view of contrapoint, it is absolutely the same every 
time it is rendered so with substantial correctness (though it be a trifl e out of tune 
and time) it is a Type. But any one singing of it is neither Tuone nor Type but a Token. 
Notwithstanding these diffi  culties in many cases there is no room for an instant’s 
hesitation, and the distinction is not only useful but practically indispensable.
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Th e immediate object of a sign may be of quite a diff erent nature from the real 
dynamical object. Let the object really be ever so complex, yet if it is presented without 
analysis, and in such a way as to have no defi nite identity, the Immediate Object is a 
simple quality. Th us a substantive with the indefi nite article has a simple quality for 
immediate object. A proper name on the contrary has a well-known existent thing for 
its object, even if like Othello, it be a fi ctitious object. But this cannot be the case for 
an interpreter who has never heard of the thing or to whom the name is new.
[278r] A sign may have for its immediate object a determining course of nature, 
or habit of things. Th us if I say every President of the United States has been a high-
minded man, I conceive that the operation of some natural law has made them so. 
Th is is a way in which the precise meaning may be expressed; and it is the fi rst rule 
of logic that in pure thought in whatever way a thing can be accurately conceived in 
that way it is; because pure thought has no other being than that of representing its 
object. Th is is not only the way the matter may be regarded but the way it must be 
regarded subject to an exception I shall mention presently. Th e reason it must be so 
regarded is that a sign cannot have two objects. You may represent a pair of things, 
or a triplet, etc. other collection number, but it will be a single pair, a simple triplet, 
or a single other collection. So the exception I alluded to is that the sentence (which 
is in so far ambiguous) may be taken to mean that the succession of Presidents of the 
U.S. (which succession is a unique object) is a succession uninterrupted of honorable 
men of certain sentiments. Usually as when we say “All men have two legs” we plainly 
refer to the nature of men, since some monstrosities reckoned as men have diff erent 
numbers of legs.
APPENDIX B. Excerpts from the Logic Notebook (MS 339)
1905 Oct 13 [262r].
A. Nature of Sign in Itself
 Abstraction  = Qualisign
 Existent  = Sinsign
 Combinant Type = Legisign
B. Of Object
a. Immediate
  In what form object is represented in sign 
  {Indef. / Sing. / General 
  As far as aff ects form of signs
b. Dynamical
  α. Nature of Object in Itself 
   {Abstraction / Concrete / Collection
   As far as it aff ects nature of sign
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  β.  Cause of sign being determined to represent Obj. Causation of signs 
   representing Obj
C. Of Interpretant
 a. Immediate
  How In what form interpretant is repr. in sign 
  {Interrog / Imper. / Signifi cant
  As far as it aff ects form of sign
b. Dynamical
 α. Nature of Interpretant in Itself
  {Feeling / Fact / Sign
  As far as that aff ects Nature of sign
 β. Cause of sign being determined to being represented / to aff ect Causation  
  of sign aff ecting Interp.
  {Sympathy / Compulsion / Representat
c.  Representative
 α. In what form sign is represented in Interpretant
  As far as this aff ects form of sign.
 β. Causation of representation of Sign by Interpretant.
  As far as this aff ects the nature of the Sign.
 γ. Rationale of Connection between Sign and Object aff ected by Interpretant.
APPENDIX C. Excerpts from the Prescott Book (MS 277)
1909 Oct 28. P.M. 6:30. Another endeavour to analyze a Sign. A Sign is anything 
which represents something else (so far as it is complete), and if it represents itself 
it is as a part of another sign which represents something other than itself, and it 
represents itself in other circumstances, in other connections. A man may talk and 
he is a sign of what he relates. He may tell about himself as he was at another time. 
He cannot tell exactly what he is doing at that very moment. Yes, he may confess 
he is lying, but he must be a false sign, then. A Sign, then, would seem to profess to 
represent something else.
Either a Sign is to be defi ned as something which truly represents something or 
else as something which professes to represent something.
[What follows are the “immediately preceding passages” in the Prescott Book.] 
Of the distinction between the Objects, or better the “Originals” and the 
Interpretant of a Sign.
By A “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or set of 
Objects, called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its turn is, capable 
of determining a Mind, something called its Interpretant, and that in such a way 
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that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to some mode of conformity to the 
Original or Set of Originals. Th is is particularly intended to defi ne (very imperfectly 
as yet) a Complete Sign. But a Complete Sign has or may have Parts which partake of 
the nature of their whole; but oft en in a truncated fashion.
Th e Interpretant brings a state of things to appear, either in Imagination or in 
Facts, or in Tendency is the infl uence exerts upon the mind, Eff ect upon the mind or 
Venues that the sign brings to pass, either causing a state of feeling, or an Imagination, 
or concentrating attention, or it may or may stimulate to action whether external, or 
an exertion of attention, or it may cause a state of mind of the nature of a disposition 
or habit.
A sign is in regard to its Interpretant in one or another of three grades of 
Completeness, which may be called the Barely Overt, the Overter, and the Overtest. 
Th e Barely Overt sign, of which a name is an example does not expressly distinguish 
its Original from its Interpretant, nor its reference to either from the Sign itself. Th e 
Overter sign of which an Assertion is an example.
Th us the Sign has a double function.
First, to aff ect a mind which understands its “Grammar”, or Method of Signifi cation, 
which signifi cation is its Substance Signifi cate or Interpretant.
Second, to indicate how to identify the conditions under which sign its signifi cate 
has the mode of being it is represented as having.
1909 Oct 29. A.M. 10:45. It will probably be profi table to trace out the varieties of 
signs of themselves. Take, fi rst, icons. A ring bearing a repeated pattern, considered 
as starting at any point may be an indefi nitely exact icon of itself considered as 
starting at any corresponding point. Yet it is necessary that these points should be 
individually identifi ed; and that requires that there should be something which is 
not copied, each as the E and S of the fi gure. Th is is true 
of every icon. If it were in all respects a perfect icon it 
would be indistinguishable from and for all intents and 
purposes the very same thing as its Object. It thus seems 
to be of the very essence of an icon that it should not be 
perfect; and if this be so, then unquestionably an icon may 
represent nothing but itself, by every part of it representing 
a diff erent part and there being a cycle of representations. 
Instead of a cycle there may be an endless sequence of representations. Th us imagine 
the series of all real positive rational quantities to be expressed in the order of their 
values as a doubly endless series of fractions in their lowest terms. Th en the whole 
series of their numerators may be regarded as an icon of the numerators of their 
doubles and those of their triples and so on and may be regarded as represented by 
the series of numerators of their halves their thirds etc. and so on ad infi nitum both 
?
??
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ways and in all these their limits (which may be regarded at will as included areas 
excluded) remain the same.
1909 Oct 29 P.M.2:00. When the cause as appearance is so connected with a state 
of things as to indicate the presence of the latter it is an index of that state of things.
Th us the woman’s coming out of the weather-houses is an index of moisture in the 
atmosphere. A purple precipitate an addition of a salt of tin is an index of the presence 
of gold. Th e communication of blue to starch paste is an index of the presence of free 
iodine etc.
So the appearance of a faint light in a particular point of the heavens as viewed 
through a great telescope is an index of such a light there whenever one looks there 
even without a telescope. Is this not an index of itself? Intensifi cation of any sensation 
comes under the same head.
But one of the functions of an Index is to call attention to something, as when one 
points a fi nger. Now is there any reason why a thing should not call attention to itself? 
It is true that if a sign calls attention to anything, it is in order to bring something else 
to attention. But it may be that that is at bottom itself, in some cases.
May not a testimony be emphatically a witness of its own truth, so that it is 
impossible not to believe it?
1909 Oct 30. P.M. 1:00. As for Indices, it is plain that a man may point to himself 
and the purpose of many an exclamation is chiefl y to call attention to itself and its 
neighbours in space and time of whatever description they may be.
Or say “whatever they be”. [And by the way, why should not a scientifi c dialect 
have a special grammar, selective pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, and perhaps 
even interjections.]
One incidental remark may be made here. Th e question may be asked whether a 
photograph is an Icon or an Iconic Index, since similarity with its object is produced by 
physical necessity. Now if the distinction between Icon, Index, and Symbol be, as I have 
defi ned it, a distinction in the relation of the Sign to its Real or Dynamical Object, then 
the Photograph is certainly not an Icon but is an Index, and the phrase “Iconic Index” 
seems to be self-contradictory. But using my terminology of 13/3 years ago, its relation 
to its Actual Interpretant and still better the word (though not exactly the defi nition) 
that I proposed 1905 Oct 12 [Appendix D], it is an idoseme (then spelled Eidoseme). 
Th at is to say that it directly exhibits its signifi cation, or Dynamic Interpretant (But 
Qu[estion]: Is it the dynamic interpretant? It is rather the “signifi cation” or interpretant 
as embodied in the Real Object.)
Th at is to say, it brings up the ideas which are referred to the object by Association 
by Resemblance and neither by Association by Contiguity, or yet by the third mode of 
Association as that which is capable of accounting for the facts exhibited.
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APPENDIX D. Excerpts from the Logic Notebook (MS 339)
[256r] 
1. Th ere are signs each of which A sign may have for its object represented an 
abstract fragment of being not capable of existence by itself, or even of distinct 
representation apprehension without a sort of blurr [sic.] attached to it, the vague 
appellation of what is omitted. Such a sign may be termed a hypostatically abstract 
sign, or a Hypostatic.
1905 Oct. 12. [257r].
2. Th e dynamic object represented may be an existent represented as existing 
regardless of any other existence. Such a sign may be termed a Concrete.
3. A sign may have for its dynamic object a type in its mode of having as type 
object; that is, as existing in combining generalized existents. Such a sign may be is 
termed a Collective.
 β. As to manner in which the sign is determined to represent the dynamical 
 object.
1. A sign may represent its dynamical object simply by virtue of its own abstract 
quality. It thus represents whatever else has that quality. Such a sign is termed an Icon. 
Icons either represent unanalyzed qualities, when they are simple likenesses, or they 
have structures like the structure of the object, when is found they are analogues, or 
if are made for the purpose are diagrams.
2. A sign may represent its object in consequence of being connected with it in 
fact. Such a sign is termed an Index.
3. A sign may represent its dynamic object simply by virtue of a law, or habit, 
according to which it will be interpreted as representing that object. Such a sign is 
called a Symbol.
1905 Oct. 12 continued [258r]. [C is crossed out]
C. Signs are divisible according to their interpretants
a. According to their Immediate Interpretants
1. A sign may simply seek tend to determine in the fi eld of interpretation an abstract 
an abstract quality like its own, simply. Such a sign may be termed an ejaculation.
2. A sign may have for its direct purpose to determine an actual event. Th e 
interpretant it desires may be a fact action. Such a sign may be termed an Imperative.
3. A sign may be a sign proper, i.e., have for its purpose to produce a sign immediate 
expressed purpose the determination in the fi eld of interpretation of a sign of its own 
object represented as representing itself. Such a sign may be termed a Signifi cative.
b. According to their Dynamic Interpretants.
 α. According to the nature of the Dynamic Interpretant in itself.
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1. A sign may simply tend to extend an a vague abstract quality of its own. Such a 
sign may be termed an ejaculant ejaculative. Interrogative?
2. A sign may be simply strive give expression to an eff ort to produce then and 
there a defi nite fact, in some sort opposite responsive or complementary to itself. Such 
a sign may be termed a Imperative.
3. A sign may, as a sign proper, seek to determine a sign in the fi eld of interpretation. 
Such a sign may be termed a Signifi cative.
1905 Oct. 12 continued [259r]. 
b. According to their Dynamic Interpretants.
α. As to the nature of the Dynamic Interpretant in itself.
[Th e truth of the matter is that my division of the Interpretants is feeble and doesn’t 
come out clearly nor eff ect what it should.
A sign may express a need of a {vague / defi nite {as to its nature as to the object 
to be aff ected
A sign instead of expressing a need may be itself the establishment of assent to a 
regulation, that is, may be a contract.
A sign may neither express a need nor be a transaction but may simply cause the 
interpreter to look. Or in general to produce an eff ect. To be a carrying into eff ect 
upon the fi eld of interpretation




1905 Oct. 12 continued [260r]. Th e immediate interpretant is the interpretant as the 
sign expresses it, the interpretant that the sign of itself creates; and it is to be taken 
into account in the classifi cation in so far as its diff erent relations functions (?) eff ect 
diff erent forms of the sign.
Th e dynamic interpretant is the {sign of the object / interpretant determined by the 
sign in a fi eld of interpretation exterior to the sign; and it has to be taken into account 
in so far as diff erent kinds forms of signs require diff erent kinds of {signs of the object 
/ dynamic interpretants and also in so far as the diff erent modes [of] relations of the 
excited sign of the object in the exciting sign make the latter to be function as a sign.
Th e representative interpretant is what the the sign that is required to signify the 
professed identity or agreement of the sign with its dynamic object.
a. As to the immediate interpretant
1. It may be what is required to fulfi ll a need expressed in the sign, but which is 
not itself defi nitely expressed. It may be Such a sign may be termed a Desiderative 
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Potentive. If the interpretant needed is a sign, the Desiderative [sic., Potentive] is an 
Interrogative. If it is a feeling it is an Ejaculative. If it is an action it is a Desiderative.
2. It may be that what is required is a defi nitely expressed action on a defi nite 
occasion. In that case Such a sign may be termed an Imperative.
3. It may be that the required interpretant is anything whatever that fulfi lls certain 
general conditions. Such a sign may well be termed Signifi cative.
1905 Oct. 12 continued [261r].
b. As to the Dynamic Interpretant
  α. In itself
1. Th e sign may be such that it can only be interpreted properly in feeling or in a 
possibility. [Th e reason why an abstract quality is indefi nite is that what I mean by an 
abstract quality consists in the possibility of something. Now to say that anything is 
possible is to say that under some unspecifi ed conditions it will occur. Th e some is the 
mark of indefi nitudes.] 
Such a sign may be termed an eidoseme.
2. Th e sign may be such that it can only be interpreted in an existential fact. 
Such a sign may be termed an ergoseme.
3. Th e sign may be such that it can only be interpreted primarily 
in a sign. 
Such a sign may be termed a logoseme.
 β. In the relation nature of the appeal of the sign to it.
1. Th e sign may be such that its can only natural mode of appeal 
to its dynamic interpretant is by sympathy
2. Th e sign maybe such that its can only natural mode of appeal 
to its dynamic interpretant is by compulsion
3. Th e sign may be such that its natural mode of appeal to its 
dynamic interpretant is by reason
c. As to the Representative Interpretant
α. In itself
[Th ese October 12, 1905 draft  entries end here, with the fi gure on 
the left  drawn in the marginal. Th e next entry in the Logic Notebook 
following the above pages [257r–261r] is where Appendix B begins 
[262r].]
